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ABSTRACT 
 Many of the fighters who traveled from their home states in Africa and Europe 
have begun to return as the Islamic State (IS) has lost control over much of the territory it 
seized in Iraq and Syria. These returnees are not only fighters; they are also family 
members or individuals who supported the organization indirectly. As estimated by 
Richard Barrett in Beyond the Caliphate, a minimum of 5,600 individuals have returned 
home to 33 countries around the world as of October 2017. Some of them have chosen to 
return to under-governed states rather than their nation of origin to connect with and gain 
support from Salafi-Jihadist networks or to escape punishment in their home states that 
have implemented strict policies of judicial punishment for IS and its supporters. 
Returnees are perceived as a significant threat both due to their battlefield experience and 
their ability to strengthen existing networks and to increase convergence of disconnected 
or loosely connected networks in the region. This thesis examines governments, political 
parties, and extremist organizations via case study and network analysis to highlight 
which groups are most likely to receive returning fighters and to determine if their 
policies are likely to strengthen or weaken their ties to extremism upon their return. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. SCOPE ........................................................................................................3 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................3 
C. FOCUS ON TUNISIA AND LIBYA ........................................................3 
D. WHO ARE THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS? .............................................5 
E. HISTORICAL CONTEXT .......................................................................5 
F. RETURNING HOME ...............................................................................6 
G. STATE RESPONSES TO RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS ........8 
H. WHAT IS MISSING? ................................................................................9 
I. METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................10 
1. Macro Level—Case Studies .........................................................10 
2. Micro Level—Zignal, Gephi, and Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) .............................................................................................11 
II. TUNISIA ...............................................................................................................13 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................13 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................13 
C. RETURNEES ...........................................................................................15 
D. GRIEVANCES AND CONDITIONS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO 
THE DECISION TO SUPPORT SALAFI-JIHADISM .......................15 
E. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS: TUNISIA AS A “PUSH” 
STATE ......................................................................................................17 
F. WHO WILL RECEIVE RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS? .....18 
1. The Tunisian Government ..........................................................18 
2. Western Insurgency .....................................................................18 
3. Political Parties.............................................................................19 
4. Ansar al-Sharia (AST) .................................................................21 
G. TUNISIAN POLICY ...............................................................................22 
H. POLITICAL FRAGILITY .....................................................................23 
I. PREDICTIONS ........................................................................................24 
J. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................25 
III. LIBYA ...................................................................................................................27 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................27 
B. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................27 
1. Political History ............................................................................28 
C. CURRENT POLITICS ............................................................................30 
viii 
D. WHO WILL RECEIVE FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THEIR 
SUPPORTERS .........................................................................................30 
1. Presidency Council and the Government of National 
Accord (GNA)...............................................................................32 
2. High Council of State—a.k.a GNC—Tripoli .............................33 
3. House of Representatives (HoR)—Grand Marshal Haftar .....33 
E. EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS ........................................................35 
1. IS ....................................................................................................35 
2. ASL ................................................................................................39 
3. Convergence of Threat Groups in Face of a Mutual 
Threat ............................................................................................39 
F. POLICY FOR RETURNEES .................................................................40 
G. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................40 
IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEXT OF ISIS 
RETURNEES .......................................................................................................43 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................43 
1. Initial Data Set..............................................................................43 
2. Narrowing the Data .....................................................................44 
3. Modularity Clusters .....................................................................45 
B. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................61 
V. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................63 
APPENDIX. SNA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ..................................................65 
A. ZIGNAL ....................................................................................................65 
B. GEPHI .......................................................................................................67 
C. HUBS AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................67 
D. BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY ..........................................................67 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................69 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Tunisian Governorates at the Center of Militant Operations .....................19 
Figure 2. Territory Controlled by the GNA Is Red; Territory Controlled by the 
LNA Is Yellow ...........................................................................................32 
Figure 3. UN List of Current (as of July 2018) IS Cells Operating in Libya ............38 
Figure 4. Initial Data Set Visualized Using Yifan Hu Layout in Gephi ...................44 
Figure 5. Reduced 6-Core Network, Geographically Limited to Accounts 
Originating in Tunisia, Libya, or Null (no data). Colors Indicate 
Subclusters. ................................................................................................46 
Figure 6. Modularity Cluster 0—Gephi Visualization ..............................................47 
Figure 7. Modularity Cluster 1—Gephi Visualization ..............................................50 
Figure 8. @__benghazi Twitter Posting Alleging Army Officer Ties to IS and 
AQ ..............................................................................................................52 
Figure 9. @93_m1 Freedom Tweet...........................................................................53 
Figure 10. @schlguf Twitter Posts of Military and Security Operations ....................54 
Figure 11. Modularity Cluster 2—Gephi Visualization ..............................................55 
Figure 12. Modularity Cluster 3—Gephi Visualization ..............................................57 
Figure 13. Modularity Cluster 4—Gephi Visualization ..............................................59 
Figure 14. Zignal Labs Dashboard Example ...............................................................66 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Top 20 Provinces’ Sources of Foreign Fighters ..........................................4 
Table 2. Subcluster 0 Top Scoring Accounts ...........................................................48 
Table 3. Subcluster 1—Top Scoring Accounts ........................................................51 
Table 4. Subcluster 2—Top Scoring Accounts ........................................................56 
Table 5. Subcluster 3—Top Scoring Accounts ........................................................58 
Table 6. Subcluster 4—Top Scoring Accounts ........................................................60 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
ASL Ansar al-Sharia in Libya 
AST Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia 
BRSC Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council 
CBL Central Bank of Libya 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
GNA Government of National Accord 
GNC General National Congress 
HCS High Council of State 
HoR House of Representatives 
HT Hizb al Tahrir 
IS Islamic State  
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
JI Jabhat al Islah 
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 
LNA Libyan National Army 
LPA Libyan Political Agreement 
NOC National Oil Company 
NSA Non-state actor 
NTC National Transitional Council 
PC Presidential Council 
RT Russia Today 
UN United Nations 
  
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many of the fighters who traveled from their home states in Africa and Europe have 
begun to return as the Islamic State (IS) has lost control over much the territory it seized 
territory in Iraq and Syria. The amount of territory held by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) and its immediate predecessors peaked in 2015 and has been contracting regularly since 
that time. These returnees are not only fighters but also include families or individuals who 
supported the organization indirectly. An estimated minimum of 5,600 individuals have 
returned home to 33 countries around the world as of October 2017.1 Some of these may 
choose to return to under-governed states different than their nation of origin to connect with 
and gain support from Salafi-Jihadist or criminal networks or merely as a means to escape 
punishment in their home states who have implemented strict policies of judicial punishment 
for IS and its supporters. 
Returnees are perceived as a significant threat due to both their battlefield experience 
and their ability to both strengthen existing networks and to increase convergence of 
disconnected or loosely connected networks in the region.2 These networks were used to 
facilitate travel to Iraq and Syria, often via Libya and Turkey, and were likely strengthened 
and expanded upon during the conflict itself. It is reasonable to expect that some portion of 
returnees will use the same connections and relationships to aid their movement as the 
situation worsens in Iraq and Syria and the situation becomes untenable. Studies have shown 
that while not all, or even the majority, of returning foreign fighters will attempt either 
                                                 
1 Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees (New York: 
The Soufan Center, 2017), 5, http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-
Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf. 
2 Alastair Reed and Johanna Pohl, “Tackling the Surge of Returning Foreign Fighters,” NATO Review, 
July 14, 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/daesh-tackling-surge-returning-
foreign-fighters-prevention-denmark-rehabilitation-programmes/EN/index.htm. 
2 
domestic or transnational attacks, those plots that do involve veteran fighters are both more 
likely to succeed and more likely to result in deaths.3 
Thomas Hegghammer studied jihadis who returned between 1980 and 2010, and 
found that the rate of those who returned to their home states with the intent to conduct 
domestic terror attacks was approximately 1 in 9.4 These estimates were from a pre-IS era 
and may not accurately predict the motivations of current IS returnees or the strength of their 
existing networks. Additionally, these data focused on returnees in Europe and the United 
States and may not serve as an accurate predictor of current returnees’ future behavior in 
under-governed or fragile states. Even those returnees who lack the intent to conduct attacks 
upon their return will still likely pass through some form of state and judicial processing in 
more governed states and thus make themselves known to state security and intelligence 
services. However, even those with no intent to conduct attacks could pose a threat as 
previously unconnected or loosely connected extremist and criminal networks converge with 
those at the local and regional level. Returning foreign fighters may also converge with and 
rely upon existing networks at home comprised of those individuals who hold extremist views 
but did not make the journey to fight or were intercepted at some point in their travels and 
returned home.  
Dr. David Malet proposes that there is a “dark window” of five months beginning on 
the return of a foreign fighter. This dark window is the time in which returnees are most at 
risk of becoming domestic terrorists, and then the threat declines sharply.5 It remains to be 
seen if these estimates hold true with the return of IS fighters to North Africa and as well as 
the potential for attacks outside of the state but headquartered out of hubs of extremism like 
Libya. Malet acknowledges that his data primarily focused on returnees in North America and 
Europe in highly governed spaces and thus the conclusions reached would only serve as a 
                                                 
3 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ 
Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (February 
2013): 11–13, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000615. 
4 Hegghammer, 7. 
5 David Malet and Rachel Hayes, “Foreign Fighter Returnees: An Indefinite Threat?,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 2018, 3–5, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1497987. 
3 
starting point for research aimed at countries like Tunisia and Libya with their own unique 
challenges and environments.6 
A. SCOPE 
To illuminate and map key political organizations and jihadist networks that could 
potentially receive returning fighters, their families, and their supporters as they reestablish 
themselves in Northern Africa with special emphasis on Tunisia and Libya. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What are the key organizations and movements in Libya and Tunisia that 
facilitate the “returning faithful” following significant physical losses of 
territory in Iraq and Syria? 
• Which policies and practices by these organizations are likely to 
strengthen or weaken radicalization and commitment to violence as 
foreign fighters as their families return to Tunisia or Libya? 
C. FOCUS ON TUNISIA AND LIBYA 
Tunisia and Libya were the focus of this thesis due to the unique circumstances that 
led to so many of their citizens making the choice to travel and support IS as well as the current 
environments in both countries that returnees will face upon their return. Tunisia outpaced all 
other countries in the most recent wave of foreign fighters. Libya, while itself a significant 
source of fighters, currently serves as an attractive destination for returnees of all nationalities 
due to the internal conflict, lack of governance and strength of extremist and criminal 
networks. David Sterman and Nate Rosenblatt highlight how Tunisia and Libya far outpaced 
their neighbors in North Africa in the supply of foreign fighters when current estimates are 
examined per capita as drawn from the provincial Sunni populations.7 The originating 
                                                 
6 Malet and Hayes, “Foreign Fighter Returnees: An Indefinite Threat?” 
7 David Sterman and Nate Rosenblatt, All Jihad Is Local: Volume II :ISIS in North Africa and the 
Arabian Peninsula (Washington, DC: New America, 2018), 17, https://www.newamerica.org/international-
security/policy-papers/all-jihad-local-volume-ii/. 
4 
provinces of foreign fighters in Table 1 provide clear examples of the contrast between the 
number of fighters originating from Tunisia and Libya when compared to their neighbors. 
Table 1. Top 20 Provinces’ Sources of Foreign Fighters8 
















1 Derna (Libya) 34 163,351 97% 21.5 
2 Kebili (Tunisia) 27 156,961 99% 17.4 
3 Tunis (Tunisia) 136 1,056,247 99% 13 
4 Bizerte (Tunisia) 58 568,219 99% 10.3 
5 Sidi Bouzid (Tunisia) 35 429,912 99% 8.2 
- Grand Tunis (Tunisia) 211 2,643,695 99% 8.1 
6 Ariana (Tunisia) 41 576,088 99% 7.2 
7 Benghazi (Libya) 47 670,791 97% 7.2 
8 Tataouine (Tunisia) 10 149,453 99% 6.8 
9 Monasir (Tunisia) 34 548,828 99% 6.3 
10 Medenine (Tunisia) 29 479,520 99% 6.1 
11 Sousse (Tunisia) 39 674,971 99% 5.8 
12 Kasserine (Tunisia) 25 439,243 99% 5.7 
13 Kairouan (Tunisia) 28 570,559 99% 5 
14 Manouba (Tunisia) 17 379,518 99% 4.5 
15 Gabès (Tunisia) 13 374,300 99% 3.5 
16 Nabeul (Tunisia) 27 787,920 99% 3.5 
17 Gafsa (Tunisia) 11 337,331 99% 3.3 





(Morocco) 85 3,556,729 99% 2.4 
20 Fès-Meknès (Morocco) 50 4,236,892 99% 1.2 
 
The Moroccan province of Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceima is the first to make an 
appearance at #19 when compared to the neighboring Tunisian and Libya provinces. While 
                                                 
8 Source: Sterman and Rosenblatt, 17. 
5 
Tunisia led the world on a per capita basis in foreign fighters departing, Libya holds a 
unique role as both a source of fighters and a likely destination for returnees of all nations 
who may be unwilling or unable to return to the nations of origin. It is also likely to serve 
as a hub for those fighters intending to carry on fighting in other conflicts due to the lack 
of governance and low probability of stability in the immediate future. 
D. WHO ARE THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS? 
While exact definitions vary, the UN Security Council defines them as “individuals 
who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the 
perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or 
receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.”9 This definition 
is exceptionally state-centric in a world with an ever-increasing role of the non-state actor 
(NSA). 
The current unclassified estimate is that approximately 40,000 fighters from 120 
countries around the world made the journey to Iraq and Syria to support and fight with IS.10 
The demographics of individuals who chose to join are characterized by extreme diversity in 
the ages, origins, backgrounds, and overall conditions but with a trend towards youth and a 
higher number of women than might be anticipated.11  
E. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
There is a long history of foreign fighters traveling to fight for a cause in another 
nation. Examples include the American Revolution, the Greek War of Independence or the 
Spanish Civil War as well as a subset of Muslim foreign fighters throughout history.12 
                                                 
9 “Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (blog), 
accessed November 13, 2018, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist-fighters/. 
10 Arsla Jawaid, “From Foreign Fighters to Returnees: The Challenges of Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration Policies,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 12, no. 2 (2017): 2, https://doi.org/
10.1080/15423166.2017.1323660. 
11 Lorenzo Vidino, “European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Dynamics and Responses,” European View 
13, no. 2 (December 2014): 220, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0316-4. 
12 Georgia Holmer and Adrian Shtuni, Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017), https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/03/
returning-foreign-fighters-and-reintegration-imperative. 
6 
Current research categorizes Islamic foreign fighters of the modern era into four waves that 
began in the 1980s in their conflict with the Soviets in Afghanistan. This was followed by 
a second wave in the 1990s in the conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the 
Philippines. The third wave began after 9/11 and is associated with the American conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fourth wave is the current group of fighters from around the 
world who surged to support the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or related groups, starting 
in 2011.13 This most recent wave of fighters differentiates itself from its predecessors both 
in methods of recruitment and in the overarching goals of the organizations they support. 
F. RETURNING HOME 
ISIS surprised much of the world as they began to claim enormous swaths of 
territory in eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq beginning in 2011. Multiple 
offensives began in 2012 and reached a high point in 2015 with the declaration of the 
Islamic Caliphate. That swift and disproportionate success was combined with modern 
tools of propaganda to encourage the fourth wave of foreign fighters this thesis is 
examining.14 Since that high point in 2015, IS has been pushed out of much of their 
previously held territory and many fighters who managed to survive, found themselves 
displaced or in the hands of their enemy. Devastating IS losses resulted in the exodus of 
many fighters and supporters to their nations of origin or in search of further conflict 
elsewhere.15 
The Soufan Center, a think tank that focuses global security issues and emerging 
threats, allocates returnees into five categories. The first category consists of those fighters 
who made it to the conflict but returned after only a short period of time. The second are 
those who returned after a more significant amount of time but have returned disillusioned 
                                                 
13 Holmer and Shtuni, 402. 
14 Patrick Cockburn, “Who Are Isis? The Rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” 
Independent, June 16, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/who-are-isis-the-rise-
of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-levant-9541421.html. 
15 Andrea Beccaro, “ISIS in Mosul and Sirte: Differences and Similarities,” Mediterranean Politics 
23, no. 3 (July 2018): 410–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1330649. 
7 
after discovering that it was not everything they thought it would be. The third category is 
those fighters who eventually return but have had their fill of violence. The fourth type of 
returnee is those who were either forced out of the conflict zone or who were captured and 
eventually returned to their state of origin. The final and potentially most dangerous type 
of returnee is one who is still fully committed to the Jihadist cause and is moving to another 
state for the express purpose of supporting it.16 
The first two categories of returnee are potentially a less significant threat than the 
others and could even serve as a resource for security forces, Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) programs and the international intelligence and counter terror 
community. Many of these, but certainly not all, have also been processed through their 
government’s judicial and security systems. In states like Tunisia, most fighters and returnees 
belonging to these categories are at least known to the state security services and are under 
surveillance and required to report regularly to the state.17 The third category is a potential 
pool of fighters for extremists in future conflicts but does not pose an immediate threat. The 
social, political and economic circumstances that pushed them towards jihad in the first place 
may eventually reignite their desire to conduct attacks or reconnect with extremist networks. 
They could be described as disengaged, as they may still embrace jihadist beliefs but are no 
longer willing to act on them. This would be in contrast to someone who has undergone full 
deradicalization and no longer believes in the cause.18 Those who have fully deradicalized 
would have to essentially start their radicalization process over completely again to be 
considered a violent threat. 
 The final two categories pose the greatest threat to their home nations and their 
under-governed neighbors in the region as they have the highest potential for violence and 
destabilization. The challenge lies in determining which category a returnee may fall into 
                                                 
16 Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, 16. 
17 Lisa Watanabe and Fabien Merz, “Tunisia’s Jihadi Problem and How to Deal with It,” Middle East 
Policy 24, no. 4 (December 2017): 142, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12312. 
18 Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Jeremy J. Ghez, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=669769. 
8 
and political leaders are incentivized to err on the side of caution by treating returnees as 
viable threats with few means to prove otherwise. Leaders have proven themselves unwilling 
to accept the risk of approving policies that will potentially come back to bite them if a 
returnee was designated as low threat and then commits an attack either at home or abroad.19 
These categories are only for returnees from the conflict in Iraq and Syria and do not describe 
extremist supporters who never left or were blocked from travelling in support of IS but 
remain a potential source of danger. 
G. STATE RESPONSES TO RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS 
The policy responses of most nations regarding the return of foreign fighters 
generally fall into three categories. The first and often most preferred is one of elimination. 
Nations across the economic and political spectrum have stated they would prefer fighters 
be eliminated on the battlefield.20 While IS and its affiliates suffered serious casualties 
during the collapse of the physical caliphate, significant numbers of both local and foreign 
fighters remain and are either displaced or imprisoned by the security forces in the region. 
This leads to the second broad category of policy response, which is a legalistic and security 
focused policy emphasizing punishment on return or capture, criminal liability, and 
utilization of the security forces and the law to interdict returnees. Morocco is an example of 
a nation that has chosen a particularly hard lined security-focused response. They have 
enacted laws that mandate strong penalties of 5–15 years and a 500,000 Moroccan Dirham 
(~ $55,000) fine for even attempting to join a non-state armed organization.21 States across 
the world have also implemented laws and changed their own policies to revoke travel 
documents, criminalize certain kinds of travel and broadened the scope of prosecutorial 
powers in response to the foreign fighter threat. Australia has even gone so far as to strip IS 
supporters of their citizenship and criminalizing their presence in proscribed areas with life 
                                                 
19 Lisa Watanabe, The Next Steps of North Africa’s Foreign Fighters, CSS Analysis in Security Policy 
222 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2018), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse222-EN.pdf. 
20 Malet and Hayes, “Foreign Fighter Returnees: An Indefinite Threat?” 
21 Jawaid, “From Foreign Fighters to Returnees: The Challenges of Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
Policies,” 104. 
9 
imprisonment. This leaves them stateless and potentially increases the probability that 
fighters and their families will either attempt to return illicitly or travel to an under governed 
state like Libya where they can find some semblance of stability and a way forward.  
States that choose to utilize the courts to prosecute returning fighters also face the 
challenge of meeting a legal standard of proof and evidence. Explicit proof of an individual’s 
acts and crimes while in the service of the Islamic State can prove to be a significant hurdle 
to prosecutors and may potentially result in radicalized individuals being released after a 
relatively short prison stay into the community due to a lack of evidence. Most returnees to 
the U.S. and Europe from previous waves of Islamic foreign fighters spent less than five 
years in prison before their eventual release.22 
The third category of state response is that of deradicalization programs and attempts 
to reintegrate individuals into society. There have been a variety of programs that have 
attempted to reform Islamic-inspired terrorists in recent years and the results have been 
mixed at best. These policies require a high level of organization, governmental capacity, 
and significant resources, and they often generate political pressure for leaders who are 
accused of being “soft on terrorists.” Australian officials have reported that it costs nearly 
$8,000,000 to observe a returnee for one year.23 The political will and resources required for 
these types of programs makes them difficult to implement. The total number of returnees 
may make such a program unfeasible to implement on a broad scale but the potential exists 
for returnees who are deemed to pose the lowest risk. 
H. WHAT IS MISSING? 
An analysis of the current body of research shows that the most effort has gone into 
estimating the numbers of returnees from conflicts and whether or not they chose to continue 
on a path of violence. Less emphasis has been placed on who is receiving these individuals 
as they return home individually or in small groups or family units.  
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The study of these individuals or organizations operating outside of official state 
authority would be a significant contribution to the body of work on returning foreign 
fighters. This study would potentially identify a methodology to identify friendly, neutral or 
enemy organizations or networks that will act as the front line of receiving fighters, 
supporters and accompanying family members. These could include NGOs, family and 
friends, religious networks in addition to outright extremist organizations.  
NGOs, family, friends and religious networks all have the potential to increase or 
decrease the odds that a returning fighter will decide to strike on return. There is also limited 
information on how the return of a foreign fighter increases the probability that family and 
friends are more likely to be recruited into future extremist organizations. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
In addition to the specific groups and political organizations identified as being the 
most likely to receive foreign fighters, one of the primary products of this thesis is an 
effective methodology that can be used in the future to increase situational awareness of the 
political, economic and social issues in a given area and also serve as a means to identify 
online accounts of interest in the furtherance of national goals. This process is broken down 
into two parts. The first is the macro level that involves the development of case studies on 
a given area. For the purpose of this thesis, the case studies focus on the groups and 
organizations in Tunisia and Libya most likely to receive foreign fighters as they return from 
the conflict in Iraq and Syria. These case studies will then be used at the micro level to gather 
data using the Zignal Labs online application and to conduct social network analysis using 
Gephi network analysis program to identify accounts and individuals of interest. 
1. Macro Level—Case Studies 
Case studies will be developed for Libya and Tunisia in order to determine which 
groups and organizations would be most likely to receive returning foreign fighters and their 
supporters as they travel from Iraq and Syria. These case studies will examine governing 
bodies, political groups, extremist organizations and are not necessarily focused exclusively 
on “bad actors.” These case studies will highlight the practices and policies of the 
organizations in regards to returnees and their families. This analysis will help to identify 
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which policies are likely to be successful in mitigating the risk of returnees and which are 
likely to drive them toward violent extremism and the groups and individuals most likely to 
exploit that willingness to commit violence locally and regionally. 
2. Micro Level—Zignal, Gephi, and Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
The Zignal toolset will be used to analyze and gather data from social and traditional 
online media to identify pertinent organizations and individuals and identify key concepts as 
they relate to RFFs.24 Other Internet sites identified to be containing useful documents include 
other messaging sites like Telegram, sites for archiving posts in case they are taken down, and 
sites for posting files (like Google Drive, Dropbox, Amazon Drive, and upload-files.eu). 
The data from Zignal will be extracted into a dataset and analyzed using the Gephi 
Analysis program. This program will allow us to conduct social network analysis and identify 
individual accounts of interest. Gephi allows analysts to exercise fundamental SNA through 
graphical depictions of the network and also through some key metrics to highlight accounts 
of note. The metrics to be used in this study are hub, authority and betweenness centrality. 
Additionally, Gephi has a modularity algorithm, originally used to identify the network 
capacity of websites, which allows analysts to further divide the larger network into smaller 
subclusters of densely connected accounts sharing similar characteristics.  
The methodology used in this process has been designed to be flexible enough to be 
utilized easily and repeatedly to identify new accounts and individuals of interest in the future. 
The programs and analysis are viable options for Western partners of Libya and Tunisia like 
Department of Defense (USAFRICOM or SOCAF) or Department of State. They could also 
be utilized by civilian partners in the private or IGO realm in advancement of economic 
stability. All data collected is open source and available to the public. 
This methodology assumes that many of the returning fighters are savvy enough to 
remain inconspicuous and “below the radar” on open source social networks such as Twitter.  
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This chapter will focus on Tunisia and the political, social and economic 
environment that resulted in it serving as the source for more foreign fighters than any other 
nation in the world. This case study will examine the role of Tunisia as the spark of the 
Arab Spring as well as the fallout that came after the collapse of the Ben Ali regime. That 
period of transition contributed directly to an environment that produced significant 
numbers of dissatisfied youth who were especially susceptible to IS propaganda and 
recruitment. Additionally, I will examine how that environment has changed since the flow 
of foreign fighters has ebbed and which groups and organizations are currently in a position 
to receive returnees in the immediate future. The chapter concludes with a prioritized 
breakdown of which groups pose the greatest risks as well as which governmental policies 
are either contributing to or mitigating the extremist ideologies of returnees. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Tunisia served as the spark that helped start the Arab Spring uprisings with their 
own Jasmine Revolution and the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime in 2011.25 Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali led a regime for 24 years that had banned Islamist parties and repressed 
the forms of Islam it deemed to be a potential political or social threat. After Ben Ali’s 
ousting, thousands of Islamic activists and supporters who had been either jailed or fled 
the country years before returned in 2011 and 2012 to form the core of the Salafist 
movement.26 This Salafist network was an essential component in the radicalization of 
Tunisian youth and helped in both indoctrination, radicalization and facilitation of travel 
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and training in support of extremist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria as well 
as the ongoing conflicts in Libya.27  
The government that followed the Jasmine Revolution was one led by the Ennahda 
Party. Ennahda was Islamically based but publicly chose to operate within a governmental 
and democratic framework. They won the first election in 2012 with 40% of the vote and 
led a coalition government with two secular parties.28 At the time, Ennahda reached out to 
Salafist organizations and smaller political parties in an attempt to integrate them into the 
burgeoning democracy and as a means to cement their own political power. Those parties 
and organizations, including groups like AST, were members of networks established in 
prison or in exile abroad during the Ben Ali years. Their leaders also drew upon local 
organic support that had been suppressed during the Ben Ali regime.29 They advocated 
strongly for a government and justice system based on the concept of Sharia law. When 
this did not occur under Ennahda’s leadership, the tenuous alliance fractured split and 
Salafist groups like AST retreated further out of the realm of governance and into 
opposition. This was a foreshadowing of their eventual banning and outright opposition to 
the recognized government and its policies.30  
Salafism in Tunisia was a minority sect but could lay claim to an energized and 
numerically significant membership base. At its peak, there were over 30,000 Salafists, 
mostly young men, who gathered in 2012 at the Salafist Kairouan Congress as members of 
AST to promote the role of Islam in the new government. In 2013, Tunisia’s government 
labeled AST a terrorist organization and banned their organization after the assassinations 
of left leaning politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.31 This severed their final 
connections to a democratic governmental framework along with their ability to address 
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grievances and increased the perceived separation from mainstream Tunisian society. This 
withdrawal from formal government contributed to the perception of power gaps and 
helped fuel the call for Jihad. The organization suffered as its members were arrested or 
fled the country to join groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) in Libya or the 
burgeoning IS in Iraq and Syria. 
C. RETURNEES 
Tunisia is unique because it is, per capita, the state with the highest number of 
fighters who chose to go support the Islamic State with some estimates placing that number 
as high as 8,000. In addition to those fighters, at least 1,000 fighters traveled to neighboring 
Libya to help support the Islamic State as they made their first significant attempt at the 
expansion of the caliphate outside of Iraq and Syria in 2014.32  
Exact numbers of returnees are difficult to determine. Tunisia has improved its 
security forces and border protections since the revolution and the transition period that 
followed it. As of mid-2016, there have been an estimated 800 returnees who have come 
back to Tunisia following Islamic State losses in Iraq and Syria.33 It is reasonable to expect 
that number has grown since that time. Government officials are working to identify as 
many returnees as possible but admit that the weakened security forces and intelligence 
systems of the 2011–2014 Tunisian government were not up to the task of cataloguing 
departing fighters or their families. While those systems have improved, with the support 
of western partners, the tally of departed and returning fighters and their families remains 
incomplete.34 
D. GRIEVANCES AND CONDITIONS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
DECISION TO SUPPORT SALAFI-JIHADISM 
Tunisians, especially youth, who chose to answer the call to Jihad did so for a 
variety of reasons but there are some common and recurring themes. In addition to the 
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more common “call to adventure” type of incentives, Tunisian youth were especially 
vulnerable for several reasons. There were expectations by many that the installment of a 
new government would significantly improve the lives and overall well-being of all classes 
of the Tunisian population. The lack of economic growth coupled with a perception of 
strong inequities between under employed youth and the government was a significant 
contributor to the Tunisian foreign fighter movement.35 Many members of the Tunisian 
citizenry, including those who do not support extremist activities, have seen their economic 
and social conditions remain stagnant or even worsen over time. Additionally, areas that 
were historically neglected even before the regime change, like the western provinces in 
the country, continued to receive little support from the elites and the government and saw 
it as confirmation that they could not count on the new government.36 These aggravating 
conditions applied to both men and women who helped contribute to the nearly 700 
Tunisian women who also traveled to Iraq and Syria in support of the Islamic State. 
Research shows that family and friends of fighters shared similar grievances to the fighters 
themselves even if many never crossed the tipping point towards violence or extremism.37 
Geoffrey MacDonald and Luke Waggoner describe the apparent political paradox 
that resulted in the outpouring of fighters from a country that was attempting to establish a 
democratic system of government. They assert that the 2011 revolution “created a 
combustible mix of rising and unmanaged social expectations and declining institutional 
capacity, in a climate of persistent socioeconomic grievances.”38 In short, the expansion 
of freedom of expression in a post Ali Tunisia created expectations that neither the society 
nor the government was able to meet. MacDonald and Waggoner emphasize that it is not 
poverty itself that drives extremism but the expectations and perceptions of a population.  
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E. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS: TUNISIA AS A “PUSH” STATE 
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point defines push factors as the “the 
negative social, cultural, and political features of one’s societal environment that aid in 
“pushing” vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism.”39 They are more 
commonly thought of as “root causes” and examples include poverty, discrimination, and 
the perception of a lack of social or political power. Pull factors “are the perceived positive 
characteristics and advantages that entice an individual to join a group. The strength of pull 
factors ebb and flow with the fortunes of extremist groups over time.”40 
While there are both push and pull factors that incentivized the initial influx of 
foreign fighters in Tunisia, the political, cultural and social environment can primarily be 
categorized as one of a “push state.” This contrasts with its neighbor, Libya, whose 
environment is most accurately categorized as a “pull state.” This is true in both the role of 
a destination for jihadists and a transportation and training hub with minimal threat of 
consequence from a government in authority. Many of the factors that contributed to the 
“push” of Salafi jihadists from Tunisia to Iraq, Syria and Libya have not abated and in 
some cases have even become more pronounced in the intervening years. The perception 
of a lack of opportunity in the social, political and economic realm has remained a constant 
since the revolution. This has fueled a perceived gap between the elites and the average 
citizen and in addition to creating unfulfilled expectations it has also contributed to a 
decline in the government specifically and democracy in general. Many of the Tunisian 
policies have also continued to ignore historically neglected geographic areas in Tunisia 
outside of the largest population hubs and along the coast and to many are reminiscent of 
the pre-revolutionary era.41  
These factors were the driving force that pushed so many Tunisian youth towards 
extremist groups like IS or even neighboring ASL or AQIM. There is little evidence to 
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suggest that any of these grievances have been addressed in recent years and, if anything, 
are on track to become more acute as the Tunisian government implements more austerity 
measures and the overall economic forecast of the country continues to darken. This is in 
addition to the destabilizing effect of Libya and the countries own protracted internal 
insurgency in the western portion of the country.42  
F. WHO WILL RECEIVE RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS? 
1. The Tunisian Government 
Many returned foreign fighters have begun to process through the Tunisian judicial 
system and have either been jailed or are under house arrest with the requirement to “check 
in” with authorities on a regular basis. However, due to the limited resources and capacity 
of the penal system, many returning fighters will face relatively short period of 
confinement.43 During their imprisonment or the time immediately following it, they may 
face further efforts to strengthen or reignite their extremist beliefs. Even returnees who 
came back to Tunisia with no intent to rejoin violent movements may find themselves 
relying on the old networks that helped radicalize them in the first place or groups who 
place value on their experiences on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria.  
2. Western Insurgency 
Over the last seven years the Tunisian security forces have been fighting a local 
insurgency in its western borderlands that have resulted in the deaths of nearly 120 soldiers, 
national guardsmen and police officers. The borderland provinces can be seen in Figure 1. 
There is an even higher number wounded as a result of this conflict. The two primary 
groups conducting this insurgency against the Tunisian government are Katiba Uqba ibn 
Nafi (KUIN), affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Islamic 
State–linked Jund al-Khilafah-Tunisia (JAK-T). These groups, while associated with 
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Islamic aligned terror groups, are driven as much by financial inducements as they are by 
ideology.44 
 
Figure 1. Tunisian Governorates at the Center of Militant 
Operations45 
3. Political Parties 
a. Ennahda 
Ennahda remains the primary Islamic party in Tunisia even after the constitutional 
reforms of 2014. While they have appeared willing to operate within the limits of 
democratic norms, there is also a perception that Ennahda was overly tolerant of Salafist 
political extremism when compared to secular dissidents. Police allowed the Salafist 
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occupation of Manouba University to drag on for weeks but quickly broke up anti-Ennahda 
demonstrations in 2012.46 Ennahda’s culture of plurality and toleration of internal dissent, 
within the confines of an Islamic framework, comes from their founding and the desire to 
be as inclusive as possible to cement political power.47 The perception of Ennahda 
tolerance declined with drafting of the new constitution and the banning of AST but faith 
in the party overall is still flagging with little prospect for change in the immediate future. 
Ennahda faces the challenge of retaining a youthful portion of their party as political 
participation has dropped significantly over time among both secular and religious portions 
of the population, especially youth. The high expectations that came with revolution were 
not met with tangible success and this has created socio-economic stagnation and the 
perception of a power gap. This has undermined the belief in the value of legislative change 
and Ennahda, as well as other moderate political groups, struggle to maintain stability and 
faith in their ability to govern fairly.  
b. Salafist Parties: Jabhat al-Islah (JI) and Al-Rahma (Mercy) 
The political crisis and assassinations of 2013 led to the resignation of the 
government and the drafting of a new constitution. Tunisia continues to govern as a secular 
democracy, but does allows religiously aligned parties, like Ennahda, to operate within it. 
As of this writing, two Salafist political parties are permitted to officially exist. They are 
Jabhat al Islah (JI) and Hizb al Tahrir (HT). They are allowed to organize and operate 
within Tunisia but their affiliates been banned in several other countries.48 They work on 
the edge of legality and Tunisia may eventually ban them in the same manner AST was in 
2013.49  
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JI was the first Salafist political group founded in accordance with the Political 
Parties Law. That law required the acknowledgement of the “civil principles of the state” 
to include a respect for democracy and a rejection of violence. This group faces a similar 
challenge as Ennahda and lacks a younger generation of members.50 Al-Rahma was the 
second recognized Salafist Party but with the stated goal of the establishment of Sharia 
law. While these parties currently hold little political power, JI and HT could serve as 
mobilizing structures for extremists to undermine the existing democratic Tunisian 
government by serving as a foothold in the future. These parties have not expressed any 
specific policies regarding the return of foreign fighters beyond their normal support for 
Salafi ideology. This is at least partly due to their desire to not follow in the footsteps of 
groups like AST who were banned after their ideology and activities were deemed too 
extreme and disruptive. 
4. Ansar al-Sharia (AST) 
AST claims to have been successful in their recruitment efforts in the past due, in 
part, to their willingness to provide for their communities in a way that the Tunisian 
government failed to do after the fall of the Ben Ali government. AST leaders claimed that 
a combination of charity work, proselytizing and aid distribution all contributed to nearly 
70,000 members prior to 2014.51 Similar examples of organizations deemed extremist exist 
all around the world. Hezbollah and their sister organization ASL being some examples.  
The banning of AST as a political party is believed by some to reinforce the 
message the Salafism and democracy are not compatible. It also helped push sympathetic 
Salafists out of a purely Tunisian local context and facilitated a dispersion into the region 
                                                 
50 Nada, “The Islamist Spectrum - Tunisia.” 
51 “Tunisia: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project, March 8, 2016, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/tunisia. 
22 
at large.52 It is reasonable to expect that these messages will continue to spread to Salafi 
communities in Tunisia and to returning foreign fighters.  
AST used social media to spread their Salafist message until their eventual banning 
in 2014.53 Tunisian security services continue to pressure Salafist advocates to this day. 
AST’s former spokesperson, Sayf al-Din Ben Rayes, was arrested in 2018 even after 
publicly disavowing his support of IS but praising their actions at the same time.54 One of 
the most significant risks the fragile Tunisian government faces is the subversion of legal 
political parties and religious organizations by AST or similar groups. This would most 
likely be through the acts of dawa, which helped AST gain so much support in previous 
years. 
AST, in addition to being previously financed by both AQ and IS, supported itself 
through a network of charities and legal organizations that provide support. AST has 
divided its declared support to both AQIM and IS in recent years. While the majority of 
support has appeared to remain with AQIM, the return of fighters and their families could 
tip the scales.55  
G. TUNISIAN POLICY 
Tunisia has taken a relatively hardline stance toward returning fighters, in line with 
many of their neighbors in the Maghreb but there have been some efforts to provide 
flexibility to authorities and local leaders in dealing with returnees.56 In 2014, former 
President Moncef Marzouki proposed legislation that would provide a path for some 
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returnees to reenter society. While there was, and remains, little political will for returnee 
policies that extend beyond incarceration, the Tunisian judicial and prison system is 
stretched far beyond its capacity. A path to reintegration was proposed to avoid the 
potentially counterproductive act of simply imprisoning all returnees who would then face 
a risk of further radicalization in a confined environment.57 We have previously discussed 
the motivations for Tunisian foreign fighter’s departure and return. However, it is expected 
that a significant portion of those returning and making themselves known to authorities 
will most likely fall into the first three of the Soufan returnee categories. These are fighters 
who returned after only a short stay, returned after an extended stay but disillusioned, and 
fighters who returned but have had their fill of violence and are essentially disengaged. 
These are the individuals who are most likely to be responsive to some form of a 
DDR program but, as stated previously, ascertaining individual motivations in both the 
short and long term is politically risky and extremely difficult to execute with certainty. 
H. POLITICAL FRAGILITY 
Polling as of 2016 has shown a steady decline in the positive attitudes toward the 
Tunisian State.58 Fighters and their families are returning to a Tunisia with a plummeting 
political participation from both non-Islamic and Islamic youth.59 In 2016, only 20% of 
Tunisians said that they trusted Parliament and only 12% had trust in the political parties. 
Overall support for democracy as a form of government has declined from 63% in 2012 to 
48% in 2014. The most notable polling statistic is the expression that 95% of the youth 
surveyed expressed a “lack of confidence in political parties and nearly that number were 
disillusioned with the Parliament.60 These statistics are reflective of the high expectations 
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that many members of Tunisian society had for the post Ben Ali years and their extreme 
dissatisfaction just five years later as those expectations were not met.61 The evolution of 
the Tunisian government from the repressive Ben Ali regime to a constitutional democracy 
with three elections under its belt is still seen as more of the same. There is no reason to 
expect that faith in Tunisian government, its institutions and its political leadership will 
rise until there is a rise in the perception of accountability and economic and social gains 
that apply across the demographic spectrum.62 
I. PREDICTIONS 
Returning fighters, and those that support them, could destabilize the Tunisian state 
and the region in two ways. The first and most obvious is their convergence with existing 
extremist networks that are connected to the criminal and jihadi networks that have 
operated in the region for years. Those individuals may choose the path of criminality and 
extremism due to an inherent desire to continue the policies and goals of IS or they may 
just be attempting to avoid the legal and social consequences of their return. While groups 
like AST are blacklisted within the country, many of their networks still exist and the 
potential exists to see the convergence of returnees, local sympathizers, religious 
supporters and insurgent networks like those seen in the western provinces. 
Researchers found that close family and friends of Tunisian fighters were generally 
unsupportive of the Islamic State and the fighter’s decision to join them. On its face, this 
would appear to be a positive force to prevent returnees from converging with bad actors. 
However, without addressing the other societal conditions that led many to support IS, such 
as low unemployment and high dissatisfaction with government, returnees may gravitate 
towards those who helped them make the decision to travel in the first place.63 
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Many of the conditions and grievances that helped spur the mass of Tunisian 
fighters are still in place and in some cases are even more acute. One of the important 
distinctions, when compared to the 2011–2014 era of mass departures, is the growth of the 
Tunisian security services and the strengthening of government institutions and capacity. 
While Tunisian democracy is not as stable or as capable as many in the West believe, it is 
significantly more capable than it was in the years following the regime change. The 
overthrow of the Ben Ali regime greatly reduced the Tunisian state’s ability to control their 
own, already porous, borders and secure the state internally. Since that time, Tunisia has 
worked with international partners and bordering neighbor states to strengthen their 
security forces and their border through a variety of partnerships and agreements. 
While the government has expanded its security and intelligence capacities, the 
current Tunisian system is perceived by many as “more of the same” socially, politically 
and economically. Faith in the government specifically and in democracy more broadly is 
on the decline as the expectations of many Tunisians, especially youth, continue to meet 
reality. This is likely to continue if the government continues to neglect historically ignored 
portions of their populations and as they continue to implement more austerity measures in 
an effort to stabilize and grow their economy. 
The laws and policies put in place by Tunisian leaders are limited by the relative 
fragility of the state and the finite capacity of the government. Prisons and the judiciary are 
already strained beyond capacity and the potential return of 1000s of foreign fighters and 
their families will strain the system even more. Insurgency in the west and cross border 
flows of criminals and jihadists will continue to tax the Tunisian capacity to its limit. 
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This chapter will focus on Libya and the movements and organizations vying for 
power within a state that is severely under governed and internally fractured. 
Internationally recognized political bodies are in competition with each other for power. 
This is all occurring while the competing governments work to continue to push back 
violent extremist groups like IS, ASL and a firmly established criminal network that spans 
beyond Libya’s borders and across the region and into Europe and the Middle East. The 
competing governments currently lack the capacity to enact effective widespread policies 
in regard to the return of foreign fighters. 
Even though groups like IS and ASL have faced significant setbacks in Libya in 
recent years, they still maintain a significant presence and are taking full advantage of the 
discord and lack of faith in the ability of the government to lead Libya out of its social, 
political and economic morass. The pressure that either government has been able to mount 
against extremist groups like IS, ASL or the Muslim Brotherhood have also had negative 
impacts that could drive returnees back towards the networks that helped radicalize them 
in the first place.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Libya is unique when compared to other states in North Africa, like Morocco or 
Tunisia. In addition to local insurgents and militias with grievances against either of the 
competing governments, jihadists and their supporters have coalesced in Libya from much 
of Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Libya as an under-governed state is an appealing 
destination for both Libyans and foreign fighters from other nations seeking either refuge 
or a base for further operations in the region. The diversity of fighters could result in an 
ideological base with both the potential and the incentive to reach beyond state borders and 
stretch across the region  
In addition to serving as a logistical, facilitation and training hub for fighters 
travelling to support IS in Iraq and Syria between 2011 and 2015, many foreign fighters 
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have chosen to remain or have since returned as IS collapsed in the fall of 2016. This 
chapter illuminates Libya’s role as a hub for jihadists, returning fighters and the families. 
Actual policies and legislation are effectively non-existent as the Government of National 
Accord (GNA) and the House of Representatives (HoR) compete with each other for 
power. 
1. Political History  
Libya had been under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi since his assumption of power 
after a coup d’état against King Idris in 1969. He ruled for over 40 years and maintained a 
complicated and often adversarial relationship with the international community during 
that time, due to numerous allegations of human rights violations and his support of 
terrorism around the world. That strained relationship helped contribute to the decision of 
NATO to support rebel anti-Gaddafi forces, who were themselves primed by the Arab 
Spring, and conduct bombing air strikes in support of their efforts to overthrow the regime 
in the summer and fall of 2011. Rebel forces formed the National Transitional Council 
(NTC) and in partnership with NATO, managed to oust Gaddafi after ten months of conflict 
and tens of thousands of dead or wounded. The first Libyan Civil War appeared to come 
to an end in October of 2011 following the capture and execution of Gaddafi in Sirte.64 
As of 2018, Libya stands as the fourth-largest fighter mobilization country in Jihad 
history with an estimated 700 Libyans fighting in Iraq and Syria in support of IS.65 This is 
in addition to its use as a transit and training hub for local conflicts facilitating attacks on 
neighbors like Tunisia and the flow of fighters to Iraq and Syria in support of IS. While 
significant portions of Libya, especially the southern border regions, were historically 
under governed, the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the ensuing conflict provided a 
unique opportunity for extremists and foreign fighters of varied backgrounds and origins. 
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The temporary NTC and the current Government of National Accord (GNA), which 
continues to struggle to exert its influence, have proven themselves to be inadequate to the 
task of completely removing the extremist factions still operating within its borders.66  
Libya’s role as a hub for jihadists, migrants, training and logistics is well 
established with historical routes throughout the African continent leading to pathways in 
the Middle East and Europe. Even prior to the overthrow of Gaddafi, an assortment of 
jihadist fighters and sympathizers found their way to Libya and helped form the core of 
Jihadist groups like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and eventually Ansar Al 
Sharia in Libya (ASL), Ansar Al Sharia in Tunisia (AST), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and the Islamic State (IS).67 
The fresh conflict that came about after Gaddafi’s fall provided an opportunity for 
IS, as it attempted to expand the reach of the caliphate beyond captured territories in Iraq 
and Syria. Between 2014 and 2016, IS sent thousands of its own fighters to Libya to take 
advantage the governmental and military security vacuum. They proceeded to seize control 
of key cities like Derna and Sirte while establishing relationships and networks with tribal 
and jihadists who still harbored resentment at their exclusion from governance both during 
and after the Gaddafi era.68 While the Libyan government has been able to strengthen itself 
with the aid of neighboring states and Western partners in northern Libya, the southern 
regions and borders with neighbors remain relatively under-governed and unprotected by 
either the GNA in the east or the HoR in the west.69 
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C. CURRENT POLITICS 
Political groups have competed for power since fall of the regime with vary degrees 
of success. The GNA was recognized by the UN but they remain in competition with other 
groups seeking to usurp them. These leaders have agreed to hold national elections in 
December of 2018, as part of an attempt to help unify the country but there is still little 
consensus. The French led conference that produced this agreement did not, or could not, 
include representatives from all of the various groups engaged in conflict and that lack of 
inclusion may make future stability more challenging.70 Additionally, concerns that 
elections held in December of 2018 would be premature as security conditions are 
inadequate for most of the country and the lack of commitment from all parties to the results 
may result in further fracturing of the various groups and an increase in violence.71 
D. WHO WILL RECEIVE FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THEIR 
SUPPORTERS 
As of 2018, Libya is officially governed by the GNA. This body was formed under 
the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in 2015 and unanimously recognized 
by the United Nations (UN). The executive branch is nominally led by Fayez al-Sarraj in 
his role as the Prime Minister and the leader of the Presidential Council (PC) and is based 
out of a naval base in Tripoli. The recognized legislative body is the HoR based out of 
Tobruk in the east. Both the legislative and executive are advised by the High Council of 
State (HCS).72 Unfortunately, these bodies, while operating within the recognized 
framework as laid out in the LPA, have been unable to form a cohesive government and 
are in regular competition with each other for power. This inability to govern has kept 
Libya mired in political and economic turmoil and resulted in an under governed state that 
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is appealing to local militias and extremist groups, foreign organizations like IS, and a 
thriving criminal element.  
Elections held in 2014, prior to the creation of the LPA, resulted in the defeat of the 
interim General National Congress (GNC), which itself has assumed power from the NTC 
after the fall of Gaddafi. The GNC had been elected in 2012 after the regime change with 
approximately 60% of eligible voters participating. The 2014 election that awarded power 
to the HoR had a mere 18% turnout rate and was clouded by violence. The results of that 
election were overturned by the Libyan Supreme Court in November of 2014 but the HoR 
refused to recognize their decision.73 This drew dividing lines between the GNC, which 
leaned towards Islamic mandates and policy, and the HoR, which attracted more of the 
political moderates and secular power bases. The UN-brokered an agreement between the 
two groups that eventually became the LPA and resulted in the GNA and the installment 
of Al-Serraj as prime minister. While the LPA received UN support, neither the GNC nor 
the HoR have maintained their support for the GNA and this has disrupted the inability of 
the GNA to govern. The territory in control of both the GNA and the HoR can be seen in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Territory Controlled by the GNA Is Red; Territory 
Controlled by the LNA Is Yellow74 
1. Presidency Council and the Government of National Accord (GNA) 
The current government, the GNA, assumed power in 2015 as laid out in the LPA. 
The GNA is perceived as weak due to its inability to exert its influence over much of the 
country outside of Tripoli.75 Even the areas controlled by the GNA face regular attack, 
which in turn undermines faith in their ability to govern. Al-Sarraj, the Prime Minister, is 
not a powerful figure on his own but the Presidential Council does technically have 
powerful stakeholders from all factions. Unfortunately, the PC has dwindled to two active 
participants, Al-Sarraj and his deputy Ahmed Maiteeq. Neither the HoR nor the HCS have 
lent their political, military or economic support to this body in any meaningful or sustained 
way. The GNA are heavily reliant on militia forces such as the Misratan militias who were 
instrumental in both the fight against Gaddafi and the fight against IS in 2015 and 2016. 
The National Oil Company (NOC) and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) are both formally 
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loyal to the PC but have retained close ties with the competing factions, especially those in 
the east led by the HoR and General Haftar. In short, they have international recognition 
and authority but lack the stability or the means to implement policy or govern due to the 
lack of support from the HoR and to a lesser degree the GNC.76 
Cells of both extremists and criminal organizations operate within the territory 
claimed by the GNA. These cells could serve as a focal point for Libyan returnees 
attempting to either connect with their original support networks or foreign fighters 
attempting to converge with ideologically aligned actors that are in close proximity to high 
population areas that are susceptible to attack or potentially serve as a facilitation point for 
attacks outside of the immediate area both internal and external to Libya.77 
2. High Council of State—a.k.a GNC—Tripoli 
The HCS primarily consists of Islamists who were voted out in the 2014 elections. 
Due to the lack of security and the overall lack of faith in those results, the GNC resolved 
to maintain their hold on power and contest the election. The group is led Khalifa Ghwell 
and at one time drew their military support from militias based out of Zwara and Misrata. 
There are indications that their power is fading as supporters split between the GNA or turn 
towards the remnants of extremists groups and criminal organizations. This is the political 
group most likely to be receptive to returning foreign fighters due to their Islamic ideology 
and their hostile attitude towards both the GNA and the HoR.78 
3. House of Representatives (HoR)—Grand Marshal Haftar 
The Libyan HoR is based in Tobruk in the eastern portion of Libya and is supported 
by “strongman” Field Marshal Haftar through an alliance of militias and external 
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supporters in Egypt and the UAE as well as others.79 While the HoR is recognized as the 
legitimate legislative branch of the government, the HoR gave and promptly withdrew its 
approval of the government at large and has remained in steady conflict with the GNA 
executive branch both politically and through proxy forces like local militias.80 
Grand Marshal Haftar took part in the original coup that placed Muammar Gaddafi 
into power in 1969. While in service to that regime, he was taken prisoner during the 
Libyan conflict against Chad in 1987 and fell out of favor with Gaddafi. The United States 
helped secure his release in 1990, whereupon Haftar took up residence in Langley, Virginia 
for nearly two decades.81 He returned to Libya and served as a senior commander in 2011 
to fight against Gaddafi with rebel forces. He also organized and commanded the forces 
who took up arms against the GNC after they refused to accept election results in 2014. 
While Aguila Saleh Issa holds the official title of Chairman of the Libyan HoR, Field 
Marshal Haftar is the de facto leader and represents his faction publically.82 
Haftar was the driving force behind Operation Dignity, which began in 2014. Haftar 
organized and directed a coalition of militias and official Libyan military forces against 
Islamist forces he deemed to be a threat to his power and to Libya at large. He has focused 
on IS, the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, ASL, and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Grand Marshal Hafter claimed to have liberated Benghazi in July of 2017 even though 
conflict is still ongoing.83 
One of the primary complaints against the LNA and Haftar is a lack of distinction 
between moderate and extremist Islamists. Some experts have expressed concern that the 
broad brush attacks against Islamists of all stripes will be a significant motivating factor in 
                                                 
79 Ahmed Salah Ali, “Haftar and Salafism: A Dangerous Game,” MENASource (blog), June 6, 2017, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/haftar-and-salafism-a-dangerous-game. 
80 Toaldo and Fitzgerald, “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players.” 
81 Ali, “Haftar and Salafism.” 
82 Ali. 
83 “Libya Strongman Declares Benghazi Victory,” BBC News, July 6, 2017, sec. Africa, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40515325. 
35 
strengthening Salafi extremism and serve as a focal point for Jihadists to rally around in 
the future. Haftar’s hard line against Islamism has not inoculated him from reports of 
partnership with Salafist organizations in the East that have worked to expel political and 
religious rivals when it serves his purposes. This particular branch of Salafism is called 
Madkhalism and wholly rejects democracy or elections but “the role of wali al-amr 
(literally one vested with authority) is considered inviolable, as a direct gift from God.”8485 
The HoR controls significant amounts of territory in the northeastern portion of the 
country but has not been successful in eliminating extremist or criminal organizations. 
Additionally, Haftar himself is facing rumors of deteriorating health and has a strained 
relationship with the HoR. One high profile defector from the LNA, who served as Grand 
Marshall Haftar’s spokesman has decried his use of torture and extreme measures to gain 
political power. He has also accused Haftar of unnecessarily extending the conflict for his 
own political gains.86  
While the HoR or the LNA is unlikely to embrace foreign fighter returnees of any 
national origin openly, Haftar and his compatriots have shown themselves willing to accept 
support from all sides of the political and ideological spectrum. There is a possibility that 
the skills and experience of foreign fighters could still be put to use within the LNA as part 
of the militias or under the banner of Madkharism as means to a greater political goal. 
E. EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS 
1. IS 
While there was a long history of Jihadism and unrest in Libya for many decades 
prior, IS only began to make their push in 2014. However, the Libyan branch of IS did not 
have the benefit of playing the same role as the protector of a Sunni minority as they did 
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in Iraq and Syria, which helped drive their recruitment and propaganda campaigns locally 
and internationally. Libya, and much of North Africa, is almost exclusively Sunni and this 
lack of an ethnic and cultural denied IS an advantage it had grown to rely on in years past.87 
They quickly established, then promptly lost, a foothold in Derna in 2014, but 
moved on to establish a more secure beachhead in Sirte on the northern coast in 2015 where 
they began gathering intelligence, conducting military operations and assuming a role of 
governance over the area. They began to build strength through the defections of several 
notable members of ASL and local militias. This lent credibility to IS as ASL was perceived 
as being a more local and thus more authentic organization. It was through these 
connections that they began to establish relationships with local tribal leaders and building 
networks of militants they could draw upon. In addition to military and intelligence 
operations they conducted dawa as a form of propaganda and recruitment with the 
distribution of their own messages through the media and their attempts to govern. 
Examples of their public works, which were executed in order to strengthen their hold over 
the populace, included the renovation of the Ibn Sina hospital and some repairs and 
beautification of public spaces and streets. IS gained control over much of the local media, 
including radio, television and newspapers but failed to limit Internet access and thus their 
message was diluted by outside sources of information. They also conducted hisba 
promoting their stricter interpretation of sharia law. At their peak, IS was able to control 
over 150 miles of coastline and significant amounts of territory in and around Sirte.88 In 
retrospect, IS was able to establish some legitimacy as a governing agency in Sirte but not 
to the scale they were able to effect in Iraq and Syria.89 
The GNA expelled IS from Sirte in the summer of 2016 in an operation called Al-
Bunyan Al-Marsous or “Impenetrable Wall.” The GNA conducted this operation through 
the support of local Misratan militias as well as a heavy reliance on U.S. air support with 
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over 500 strikes by the time operations ended in December.90 This resulted in an estimated 
loss of 2,500 fighter to include some of its key leaders within the city and the territory they 
previously held.91 
While IS was largely expelled from the territory it held, the organization itself has 
not completely dissolved. The GNA has dispatched forces to previously held IS territory 
like Sirte and Sabratha to combat remaining cells, who conduct regular attacks, as well as 
IS members working in partnership with local criminal operations. A UN report from July 
of 2018 asserts that “ISIL cells persist around Tripoli, Misrata and Sabratah in the west, 
with a substantial presence in southern Libya around Ghat and Al Uwainat, and Ajdabiya 
and Darnah in the east.”92  
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Figure 3. UN List of Current (as of July 2018) IS Cells Operating 
in Libya93 
There was a rise in IS associated attacks in 2018 with more than a dozen reported. 
This is a significant increase from four attacks in 2017.94 The cells conducting these attacks 
are the most likely destination for foreign fighters of the following categories. The first are 
foreign fighter returnees of Libyan origin who are returning home after their displacement 
from Iraq and Syria. Additionally, foreign fighters of non-Libyan origin may choose this 
poorly governed space with the explicit goal of resurrecting and strengthening IS in Libya. 
Lastly, there may be an influx of foreign Fighters of non-Libyan origin who with no express 
intent to continue on the path of Jihadism, but fear legal and social repercussions in their 
states of origin or those who feel they have nothing to go back to. 
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2. ASL 
ASL announced itself in December of 2011 in Derna and February 2012 in 
Benghazi and served as an infrastructural base for foreign fighters from that point forward. 
ASL maintained a strong relationship with their sister organization AST and facilitated the 
transfer of weapons and training for attacks in Tunisia but based out of Libya where 
Tunisian security forces had little ability exert force.95 Aaron Zelin describes ASL as 
having a number of identities to include “a charity, a security service, a health service, and 
a religious education provider.” They have also been labeled as “a militia, a terrorist 
organization and a training base for foreign jihadists.”96ASL initially focused on both 
dawa (outreach) as a means to gain support through the provision of social services inside 
and outside of Libya. One estimate from 2014 places ASL supporters in Beghazi alone 
between 45,000 and 50,000.97 That initial swell of support was halted with the assumption 
of military offense against the group by Grand Marshal Khalifa Haftar in May 2014. ASL 
halted most of its dawa activities to focus on military action.98 The group formally 
disbanded in May of 2017 but some analysts believe ASL has the most potential for 
“staying power” when compared to other jihadist organizations. This is due to the historical 
local and regional emphasis that ASL has expressed in the past in contrast to the world-
wide aspirations of a group like IS. ASL also retains some of the reputation as a more 
organic and thus authentic Libyan group with closer familial ties and established 
relationships with many of the Islamist and jihadist groups in the region.99 
3. Convergence of Threat Groups in Face of a Mutual Threat 
While groups like ISIS and ASL have differing objectives and have come into 
conflict over those differences, there is also a history of their unification in the face of a 
                                                 
95 Zelin, The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya, 5. 
96 Zelin, “The Rise and Decline of Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya,” 104–5. 
97 Henrik Gråtrud and Vidar Benjamin Skretting, “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya: An Enduring Threat,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (February 2017): 3. 
98 Zelin, “The Rise and Decline of Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya,” 104. 
99 Gråtrud and Skretting, “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya,” 1–3. 
40 
great threat. One example is the alliance of IS and ASL fighting against Haftar in Benghazi 
in response to his Operation Dignity offensive.100 The willingness of these groups to work 
together in the face of adversity and pressure could serve as a converging point for 
returning foreign fighters and their families.  
Some of the fighters, and their families, who are unable or merely have no desire 
to return to their home states may converge in Libya due to its weak governance and 
security structures and the remnants of multiple jihadist groups and networks.101 Due to 
these weaknesses and internal conflict, Libya has been unable to implement even the 
legalistic state response that many of their neighbors have. Individuals who may have 
originated in other countries may make the decision to avoid the near certain chance of 
judicial punishment and oversight and instead rely on jihadist networks established during 
their transit to Iraq and Syria or during training in Libya in earlier years.102 
Push factors, those “root causes,” are often more difficult for a state to address. This 
is true in many North African countries and especially so in Libya. The result is that even 
as groups like ASL and IS gain and lose power, the draw towards radicalization and the 
incentive to maintain it when returning remains. 
F. POLICY FOR RETURNEES 
Libya, due to its internal divides, lacks any consistent legal or judicial policy for 
returning fighters of both Libyan and non-Libyan origin. The majority of interactions with 
returning foreign fighters are on the battlefield or judicially. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The emphasis for the United States and its allies in their support to Libya should 
primarily revolve around governance and security. Partnerships with military units like 
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AFRICOM and SOCAF should focus on developing trained and sustainable forces under 
the auspices of the GNA. The HoR, while currently holding significant amounts of territory 
through its support by outside countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, lacks the potential 
for long-term cohesiveness. This is especially true if reports about Field Marshal Haftar’s 
health are to be believed. This is in addition to his advanced age. 
These partnerships will help strengthen the faith of the populace in GNA governed 
territory and eventually help it to expand outside of the portion of Libya it currently has 
only a modicum of control over. A strengthened GNA with an adequate security force will 
also serve to help counter the groups most likely to take advantage of the return of foreign 
fighters. IS, ASL, the Muslim Brotherhood and others are all able to continue to operate 
and expand in Libya due to the lack of governance and security.  
IS should remain the priority even though they are not a “local” organization. They 
have proven themselves to be adept at recruitment and network development. Libya is 
“prime real estate” for this sort of group to consolidate and prepare further operations and 
they still have connections and motivated members to build upon. 
In addition to general governance and security, there should be an added emphasis 
on the judiciary. USAFRICOM, SOCOM, and DoS are well placed, through Civ/Mil 
partnership, to help facilitate the training and build the foundations necessary to create a 
judicial system that can process foreign fighters and their families. This would also 
necessitate the creation of policy to address the return of non-Libyan fighters to their states 
of origin. This is particularly challenging as many states want to keep departed foreign 
fighters as far away from their borders as possible. 
  
42 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
43 
IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEXT OF ISIS 
RETURNEES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter uses social network analysis (SNA) to provide a quantitative analysis 
of accounts associated with key words related to extremism, politics, and foreign fighters 
and linked to either Tunisia or Libya. In essence, I use the case studies to inform my 
analysis and identify key themes and accounts that are likely to support ISIS returnees or 
are accounts that they would likely connect with upon their return. The Tunisian case study 
delineates the current political situation, key players, political parties, and organizations 
that potentially pose a threat. These threats include the internal insurgency in the west and 
the regional threats such as IS, AQIM, and the remnants of AST/ASL. It highlights the 
relative fragility of the government as it rebuilds in post Arab Spring era. The Tunisian 
case study also brings to light the key issues of the perceptions of a gap between the elites 
and the mass population. This is especially true in historically neglected areas. All of these 
factors helped contribute to the initial surge of fighters and highlight which of those players 
and environmental conditions are still in place as foreign fighters return and make the 
decision to either reintegrate or hold on to an extremist ideology. The Libyan case study 
suggests the political and military situation in Libya is so complex that analysis is virtually 
impossible without a thorough understanding of who is competing for power. This applies 
to both the official governments competing with each other and the extremist organizations 
who continue to undermine whatever progress has been made.  
1. Initial Data Set 
The initial data set is comprised of data drawn from Zignal that was collected from 
Twitter during the months of September and October. This was done to provide the most 
up to date accounts as they related to the topic at hand. The initial data set is comprised of 
42,378 Twitter accounts with 64,248 edges or connections between them (see Figure 4). 
The vast majority of these accounts are only loosely connected to the largest sub-cluster 
and due to its size is unmanageable and not useful for analysis. Modularity analysis 
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identifies over 9,000 subgroups within this enormous data set. The majority of these are 
isolates; that is, they are accounts with no ties to other accounts. The next step in this 
process is a reduction of the mass data set into a more useful product.  
 
Figure 4. Initial Data Set Visualized Using Yifan Hu Layout in 
Gephi103 
2. Narrowing the Data 
The initial data set of 42,378 was reduced using k-core analysis, which is a useful 
approach for identifying dense pockets (cores) of actors with direct ties to most of the other 
                                                 
103 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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members of the core.104 K-cores are formally defined as “a maximal group of actors, all 
of who are connected to some number (k) of other group members.”105 In short, these are 
groups interconnected actors who have at least k ties with other members of the core. A 6-
core reduced the data set to a total of 2,051 accounts, each with a minimum of six ties and 
a total of 16,935 connections between them (Figure 5). The data set was additionally 
screened for geographic account origin from either Libya or Tunisia. Accounts with no 
geographic location are also included but only those that remain after the k-core analysis 
was complete. These accounts are tied closely enough to Libyan and Tunisian accounts 
that they retain analytical value.  
3. Modularity Clusters 
The reduced dataset, now to be referred to simply as the network, was analyzed 
using a community detection algorithm or what is sometimes called modularity analysis in 
order to identify the optimal number of subgroups based on the pattern of ties in the 
network. Modularity analysis assumes that subgroups have more ties within and fewer ties 
between them than one would expect in a random graph of the same size and density. 
Gephi’s modularity algorithm identified five (5) subclusters (different colored nodes in 
Figure 5). Using a layout algorithm called Yifan Hu, Gephi broadly aligns the Libyan 
accounts on the bottom of Figure 5 (subclusters 0,1, and 3) and the Tunisian accounts 
(subclusters 2) towards the top. Subcluster 4 is mostly aligned with Libyan originated 
accounts but lies between the two sections as there are ties to accounts from both countries. 
The subclusters are labeled in order by the number of nodes they contain within them with 
subcluster 0 having the most actors (41.83% of the total) and subcluster 4 (3.46% of the 
total) having the least. 
These clusters will be compared individually and against each other using the social 
network analysis metrics of hub, authority, and betweenness centrality in order to identify 
                                                 
104 Daniel Cunningham, Sean F. Everton, and Philip J. Murphy. 2016. Understanding Dark Networks: 
A Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 
118 
105 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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common themes and characteristics of the top accounts. These metrics were chosen to help 
identify accounts with whom a returning foreign fighter, or their family, would potentially 
interact or connect. The metrics for each category have been normalized so that scores 
range between 0.0 and 1.0. Google and Microsoft translation software was used to facilitate 
analysis of all accounts. Definitions of these metrics can be found in the appendix. 
 
Figure 5. Reduced 6-Core Network, Geographically Limited to 
Accounts Originating in Tunisia, Libya, or Null (no data). Colors Indicate 
Subclusters.106 
                                                 
106 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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a. Modularity Cluster 0 
This is the largest subcluster within the network and is primarily aligned with 
accounts labeled as originating in Libya. It consists of 858 separate accounts with 6,147 
connections between them. The network visualization in Figure 6 colors the accounts 
(nodes) by country of origin. Most of the top-ranked accounts in terms of hub, authority, 
or betweenness centrality self-identify as originating in Libya (see Table 2).  
 
Figure 6. Modularity Cluster 0—Gephi Visualization107 
 
                                                 
107 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Subcluster 0 Top Scoring Accounts108 
Top 5 Hub Centrality 
   
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Hub Score Followers  
trhonymohamed Male Libya Al Jufrah 0.158 8,749 
bushnaff Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.153 6,555 
sarahssanoussi Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.123 391 
s Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.089 92,667 
waad_algeddafi Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.088 3,877 
      
Top 5 – Authority Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Authority Followers  
matogsaleh       0.135   
osamathini Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.105 3,449 
lywitness Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.104 2,245 
aliwahida       0.074   
observatoryly Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.073 13,114 
      
Top 5 - Betweeness Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province 
Betweenness 
Centrality Followers  
bushnaff Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.090 6,555 
hiba76sh Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.045 7,035 
motazkraif Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.028 12,634 
mohamedsh82 Male Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.025 1,963 
elganga90 Male Libya Az Zawiyah 0.019 1,487 
                                                 
108 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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The accounts scoring highest in hub centrality are generally posting pro-Libyan 
content through they support competing factions in the current conflict between the GNA 
and HoR and even one account who longs for the days of Gaddafi. There are multiple 
references across these accounts to local fighters, martyrdom and Islamic quotes and 
phrases supporting their positions. These are the type of accounts that a newcomer to the 
region may come across when looking for a resource to point them towards accounts with 
high authority scores. 
The accounts ranked highest in terms of authority centrality include two Libyan 
news organizations as well as accounts with international content. These are the accounts 
that a newcomer might look to as sources of information and were possibly found through 
the accounts with a high hub score. 
The accounts ranked highest in betweeneess centrality shared fewer common 
themes; posts centered on local issues and how they were affected by international actors 
like NGOs, aid organizations and the UN.  
Accounts of note include @osamathini (top five in authority centrality), who claims 
to be an “Ambassador of the South and the Libyan Desert.” This is an example of someone 
who could be easily found by a foreign fighter or a recent arrival looking for contacts or 
situational information on the ungoverned southern portion of Libya. Additionally, 
@elganga90 (betweenness) has ties to a German consulting firm and expresses his support 
for #illegalimmigrants and human rights oversight. Only one accounts, @bushnaff, appears 
in multiple top 5 categories (hub and betweenness), but she appears to be more of a 
traditional social media user posting pictures of food and her daily activities. This account 
could still be easily found by Libyan twitter users expanding their networks but lacks any 
political, military or economic content. 
b. Modularity Cluster 1 
Subcluster 1, while having the second fewest total number of actors, was 
subjectively one of the most politically and militarily active groups. It contains 206 nodes, 
which share 933 ties among them. Approximately 75% of the accounts identify as 
originating in Libya, with 22% lacking any country of origin attributes. Five originated in 
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Tunisia but all scored low in terms of hub, authority, and betweenness centrality. This 
cluster was the most active in regards to political and military activities and news stories. 
Subcluster 1 is presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Modularity Cluster 1—Gephi Visualization109 
Most of the top-ranked accounts in terms of hub centrality are well established with 
creation dates as far back as 2011 (see Table 3). The exception is @samelibya3, which was 
created in January 2018. Islamic themes and quotes were present throughout all of the 
accounts. The @samelibya3 account references the failures of both the HoR and the GNA 
and displays an explicit bias against outside countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia. The 






                                                 
109 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3. Subcluster 1—Top Scoring Accounts110 
Top 5 – Hub Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Hub Score Followers  
samelibya3 Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.023 303 
__benghazi Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.020 2,641 
zakbouhali Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.015 3,695 
azzubia94 Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.015 1,259 
riyadhalrifai Male Libya Benghazi 0.014 1,084 
      
Top 5 – Authority Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Authority Followers  
93_m1 Male Libya Misratah 0.011 1,126 
guma_el_gamaty Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.010 170,803 
elashwa2i       0.010   
diamondodoo       0.009   
salimgashout72 Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.008 483       
Top 5 - Betweenness Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province 
Betweenness 
Centrality Followers  
shgluf Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.022 4,352 
93_m1 Male Libya Misratah 0.015 1,126 
benghazi_of Male Libya Al Jufrah 0.011 60 
apqybap Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.010 4,314 
dadsos22 Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.007 3,191 
                                                 
110 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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A second account of interest among the top-ranked hubs is @__benghazi, whose 
tweets include regular references to colonization and the importance of independence from 
outsiders. While this account has posted anti-GNA and HoR tweets, it also claims to be an 
individual serving in the Army with ties to both AQ and IS (see Figure 8). The remaining 
top-ranked scorers in hub centrality posted political and economic news regularly, as well 
as on high visibility media topics like the conflict in Yemen and Jamal Khashoggi. 
 
Figure 8. @__benghazi Twitter Posting Alleging Army Officer 
Ties to IS and AQ111 
The top-ranked accounts in terms of authority centrality are also politically and 
militarily driven. The top scoring account, which also ranked second in betweenness, is 
@93_m1. This account has an overt anti-HoR and Haftar bias and is focused on the cities 
of Benghazi and Derna. Aside from regular posts about his anti-Saudi positions and 
economic postings, one tweet stood out, which stated, “Freedom leads to death ” (Figure 
9).  
                                                 
111 Benghazi (@__benghazi), “كیان. “فیھ الخیر منتمي لتنظیم القاعدة وداعش ومحتفظ ببطاقة الجیش امتاعھ,” [Al-




Figure 9. @93_m1 Freedom Tweet112 
A second account of interest is that of Guma El-Gamaty. He is a Libyan politician 
who was educated in the UK and lived in exile for most of Gaddafi’s rule. He served as the 
liaison for the transitionary NTC government and now heads the Taghyeer Party in Libya, 
which is not Islamically aligned. He has a significant number of followers with over 
170,000. He is focused on economic issues like many of the accounts in this cluster. He 
has also authored several articles, the most recent of which is titled, “How Can Libya Be 
Stabilized?: Efforts To Stabilise The Situation in Libya Should Start with Curbing Foreign 
Interference in the Country.”113 The article was an Al-Jazeera op-ed in August of 2018; it 
attempts to highlight the influence that the UAE and Egypt have exerted with their support 
to Grand Marshal Haftar and the LNA, as well as the competing attempts of both France 
and Italy to unify the country overall. El-Gamaty asserts that independence from all of 
these outside nations is essential to the drafting and passing of a new constitution that could 
potentially unite all of Libya. This is an account of a mid-tier politician and academic who 
                                                 
112 Mohammed BZ (@93_m1), الحریة تؤدي الى الموت [Freedom leads to death ], Twitter, November 3, 
2018, https://twitter.com/93_m1/status/1058848268711612416. 
113 Guma El-Gamaty, “How Can Libya Be Stabilized?: Efforts To Stabilise The Situation in Libya 
Should Start with Curbing Foreign Interference in the Country.”” Al Jazeera, August 30, 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/libya-stabilised-180830151116488.html. 
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should be regularly reviewed if only to gain insight into the political and economic 
struggles in Libya. Hostile actors are also likely within his significant follower account and 
could potentially be identified with a deeper look. The final metric of betweenness 
identifies at least two accounts of interest. The first is the aforementioned @93_m1 with 
his focus on Benghazi and Derna as well as his post highlighting the dangers of freedom. 
The top scoring account belongs to @shgluf whose posts are of a more military nature 
although he also tweets regular political postings. This account regularly tweets anti-Haftar 
posts as well as original content (non-retweets of other accounts) with photos depicting 
military vehicles and operations currently ongoing in Sabratha and Ajilat. This account, if 
regularly monitored, could provide useful intelligence in the future. 
 
Figure 10. @schlguf Twitter Posts of Military and Security 
Operations114 
c. Modularity Cluster 2 
Subcluster 2 ranked third out of five in a cluster with a total number of actors with 
238 accounts sharing 1,287 connections. This was a significant drop in the total number of 
accounts in the next highest cluster (Subcluster 3—678 total accounts). This subcluster was 
the only one analyzed that contained a majority of accounts with origination data from 
Tunisia (156 accounts—75% subcluster total). The remainder in this subcluster lacked 
origination data except for 13 accounts from Libya.  
                                                 




Figure 11. Modularity Cluster 2—Gephi Visualization115 
The top-ranking accounts in terms of hub centrality consistently conveyed themes 
of Islamic imagery and quotes as well as some military and political content. Interestingly, 
all of the accounts with the top-ranking hub scores did originate from Libya even though 
they made up the minority of actors in this subcluster. This is most likely due to their 
connections to accounts outside of the subcluster even though they retained enough 
connections to be grouped with the majority Tunisian group. The top-ranked account, 
@akai_senkoo, included an Islamic reference in nearly all of his posts and expressed 
general anti-Western sentiments. The other account of note, @Rjaonkey_mhamad, 
includes profile photos of a Fort Knox tank and a military style glove. The account user is 
“The Unknown Soldier.” This account focused on international politics at both the regional 
and worldwide level with regular posts against Qatar and the UN. The remaining top-
ranked accounts included some political content and regular postings from Russia Today 
(RT). 
 
                                                 
115 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4. Subcluster 2—Top Scoring Accounts116 
Top 5 Hub Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Hub Score Followers  
akai_senkoo Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.012 64 
worfaly Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.011 72 
meme88766654 Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.010 788 
rjaonkey_mhamad Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.008 328 
anasmilad51 Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.004 427 
      
Top 5 – Authority Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Authority Followers  
alhadath       0.011   
skynewsarabia       0.010   
ajplusarabi       0.007   
juli_ree       0.004   
tsaolaat       0.003   
      
Top 5 - Betweenness Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province 
Betweenness 
Centrality Followers  
khaoula_rmd Unknown Tunisia Kebili 0.028 5,011 
amar_yosra Male Tunisia Kebili 0.019 17 
ghofranekb Unknown Tunisia Kebili 0.017 7,545 
sanamahfoudhi Female Tunisia Kebili 0.011 1,557 
tounisia12345 Unknown Tunisia Kebili 0.008 9,376 
                                                 
116 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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The highest-ranking authority accounts were all focused on news and political 
reporting. The top two accounts, @alhadath and @skynewsarabia, seemed relatively 
mainstream but the account @AJplusarabi had an explicit anti-Israel bias. The betweenness 
metric provided no accounts of interest. They were primarily centered on students and local 
soccer. As in other clusters with little political or military posting, these accounts would be 
likely points of connection to youth, but they are not directly tied to the Libyan conflict or 
extremism. 
d. Modularity Cluster 3 
This is the second largest subcluster within the network. It has 678 accounts with a 
total number of 4,784 connections between them. 576 accounts identify with an origin in 
Libya and make up over 84% of the total. There is only one Tunisian account and 102 
accounts with no identifying geographic data. Figure 12 presents Subcluster 3. 
 
Figure 12. Modularity Cluster 3—Gephi Visualization117 
                                                 
117 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5. Subcluster 3—Top Scoring Accounts118 
Top 5 Hub Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Hub Score Followers  
amanyfaraj_ Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.112 3,163 
elferjhanie Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.108 84 
rema97bn Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.106 2,973 
felsahly Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.105 629 
ahmed__toni Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.105 170 
      
Top 5 – Authority Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Authority Followers  
dokadokaly Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.327 1,993 
hamoalgali Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.322 33,616 
boshgma Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.322 67,287 
soh_eljahmi       0.316   
h_elbargathi Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.310 918 
      
Top 5 - Betweenness Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province 
Betweenness 
Centrality Followers  
somahema2008 Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.023 136 
bawendi Unknown Libya Tajura’ wa an Nawahi al Arba 0.019 5,741 
wea_94 Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.017 185 
aziza_boushhiwa Unknown Tunisia Tunis 0.016 618 
mohamed72308485 Male Libya Al Jufrah 0.016 448 
                                                 
118 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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This subcluster was relatively apolitical, and the top-ranked accounts per all three 
metrics focused on youth, student culture, and education. There was also a common theme 
of the victims of conflict, especially those related to Benghazi. While there is little here to 
entice someone looking for politics or religious content, the top-ranked accounts are likely 
ones that a youthful person might come across. This is pertinent to the foreign fighter issue, 
as young people were the explicit targets of radicalization propaganda and those returning 
would likely connect with accounts like these. 
e. Modularity Cluster 4 
This cluster was the smallest of the five with only 71 accounts and 212 connections 
between them. The Gephi visualization (Figure 13) displays the cluster’s relative small size 
and, in context of the larger network, its relative distance from the rest of the larger and 
more densely populated and connected clusters. 
 
Figure 13. Modularity Cluster 4—Gephi Visualization119 
 
                                                 
119 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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Table 6. Subcluster 4—Top Scoring Accounts120 
Top 5 Hub Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province Hub Score Followers  
es92_ma Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00936 2,819 
69alzaem Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00734 1,664 
3h48_2011 Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.00719 326 
p5axtrb1nnpmugp Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00609 64 
starstarinthesk Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00492 1,041 
      
Top 5 – Authority Centrality    
Twitter Account Name Gender Country State / Province Authority Followers  
mltga212      0.01588   
bbcarabicalerts      0.00606   
estqfarr      0.00428   
alazkkar      0.00396   
dr_alqarnee      0.00388   
      
Top 5 - Betweeness Centrality    
Twitter Account 
Name Gender Country State / Province 
Betweeness 
Centrality Followers  
es92_ma Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00198 2,819 
ice_foaa Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00190 2,356 
nahawnd97 Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00147 3,055 
3h48_2011 Unknown Libya Benghazi 0.00125 326 
halaalsanusi Unknown Libya Al Jufrah 0.00094 4,225 
                                                 
120 Adapted from sources outlined in the Appendix. 
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The accounts with the highest hub centrality scores in this cluster focused almost 
exclusively on Islamic quotes with little to no political content. The top-five accounts ranked 
high in authority centrality were split between news sites like @BBCArabic, an Islamic 
preacher with 19 million followers and more religious accounts with no overt political motive. 
The accounts scoring highest in terms of betweenness shared the common theme of medical 
students who interspersed their Islamic quotes with traditional social media pictures and 
content of their food, friends and activities. While the cluster itself is not particularly useful 
for this analysis, it does highlight the utility of the data collection methods and the analytical 
tools that allow us to identify these likely extraneous accounts and apply effort to those 
clusters and accounts that could be potentially more profitable and informative.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis of the reduced network and of the individual subclusters provided some 
helpful insights into certain groups and individual accounts. The modularity analysis 
separated the reduced network into manageable subclusters that often shared key traits among 
their users and the content they posted. Using the Social Network Analysis metrics of hub, 
authority and betweenness centrality, we were able to identify some key accounts. Analysis 
of the posts from these accounts was informed through the case studies in Chapter II (Tunisia) 
and Chapter III (Libya). 
The methodology used in this analysis provided few accounts that were explicit or 
obvious in their support of any particular group. Those accounts with strong feelings about a 
group or individual usually expressed in a negative context. In this analysis, many of the 
accounts specifically mentioned Grand Marshal Haftar and his political and military activities 
as an example. Most accounts were self-identified as originating in Libya. This could merely 
be a direct result of Libya’s higher total population but it was also likely influenced by the 
keywords used in the initial Zignal Labs collection of data. The conflict in Libya between the 
GNA, the HoR, Jihadist groups and criminal networks likely lent itself to an environment 
where the topics most closely related to terrorism, foreign fighters, military operations and 
political activities were flagged and collected by Zignal. This is in contrast to Tunisia, which 
was the source of the minority of accounts and while fragile and facing internal challenges, is 
relatively governed. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
One of the consistent themes that emerged throughout this thesis is the role of 
governance in a state. The transition to democracy in Tunisia from an authoritarian regime 
had many benefits for the state and for the region. Unfortunately, this also had the effect of 
creating high expectations among the population. When these social, economic and 
political expectations were not met, it created a perfect opportunity for outside groups to 
take advantage and recruit and radicalize in a way that would have been much more 
difficult just a few years earlier. Tunisia is looked at as the example of how states can create 
and implement secular representative democracy with a relatively small amount of 
bloodshed and upset. This is in contrast to their neighbors in the region, like Egypt or Libya, 
who faced much more conflict and in some cases are stilled mired in conflict that arose 
from the Arab Spring. The weak transitional government of Tunisia, in the years 
immediately following regime change, was not in a position to monitor their populations 
or to counter the negative actors attempting to extract as many fighters and resources as 
possible. 
Since the heyday of foreign fighters flows out of the country, Tunisia has slowly 
grown and strengthened its institutional capacity with the aid of both their neighbors and 
other, more democratically mature, nations in the West. While many of the conditions that 
fermented such a potent extremist recruiting environment are still in place, the Tunisians 
have grown in their economic, intelligence and security capabilities. It is unlikely that 
groups like IS would be able to draw as many fighters and supporters in the modern 
environment as they were able to in the early transition years. Unfortunately, conditions 
exist in Tunisia that ISIS returnees could exploit. Such conditions include overall 
dissatisfaction with the government and democracy itself, the perception of a lack of 
opportunity for much of the population, glacially slow economic growth and the 
continuation of policies that neglect historically underrepresented portions of the country. 
In short, Tunisia has a greater ability to track, counter and monitor individuals with the 
potential to support extremism but has done very little to address the conditions that create 
them in the first place. 
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Libya is still in a much more vulnerable position when compared to its neighbors, 
especially Tunisia. Libya had a longer period of transition to anything resembling an 
official government and faces the additional challenges of infighting between the official 
power bases. This is in addition to the more traditional threats of extremist groups like IS, 
AST and AQIM as well as criminal groups smuggling people, arms and other illicit goods. 
Tunisia can be described as ‘holding steady’ while there is little possibility of stability or 
adequate governance taking hold in Tunisia any time in the near future. That instability the 
“pull” potential of returning foreign fighters as well as facilitating the growth of existing 
threats, especially in the southern areas of Libya outside the control of either the GNA or 
Haftar and the LNA / HoR.  
The expulsion of IS from previously held territory by both the GNA with the 
Misratan Militias or the LNA and its supporters could lead outsiders to believe that the 
threat is eliminated. At best, it has disrupted the local networks and forced IS to take on a 
more ‘traditional’ tact of hiding within vulnerable populations as they prepare to further 
disrupt and attack in North Africa and Europe. At worst, these were unifying acts that 
helped drive formerly competing groups together in the face of a common enemy. That 
united front will be able to more easily accept newcomers, like returning foreign fighters, 
as their ideology is more expansive. This is not to suggest that any alliances will be 
permanent but for the immediate future the threat persists. 
In both Tunisia and Libya, the most important take away from this research is the 
conclusion that steady pressure and oversight must be applied in order to prevent returnees 
from converging on existing extremist networks thus strengthening them over time. This 
will require political will and adequate resources to the security forces of the states. 
Additionally, political leaders will be forced to take on some level of risk when assessing 
returnees in order to prevent the systems from being completely overrun. 
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APPENDIX. SNA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. ZIGNAL 
Zignal Labs is an online data aggregator and analysis tool that centers around 
individual campaigns for broad topics, such as a name brand or a political or social topic, 
and more specific profiles built around provided key words across the open source media 
spectrum. Zignal draws from the following data sources detailed in Table 7. 
Table 7. Data Sources from which Zignal Labs Draws121 
Data Source More Information 
Twitter - All public tweets - No promoted or private tweets 
News - Over 100,000 news websites worldwide - ~4 million articles/day 
Blogs - Over 30 million blogs worldwide - ~4 million posts/day 
Facebook 
- Page Posts: Posts from Admins of the Public Page 
- User Posts: Posts from any users on Public Pages 
- Comments: Comments on posts on Public Pages 
Social Video - 6 major social video networks, including YouTube, Youku and DailyMotion - ~4 million videos/day 
LexisNexis 
- Exclusive content from LexisNexis news corpus and analytics solutions 
- 2000+ magazines and journals, 3000+ newspapers, newswires, and press 
releases 
- Access to full text stories (additional fee) 
Broadcast 
- Coverage of over 1,000 TV stations in the US, Canada and UK including 
news and other programming 
- ~1.5 million minutes of video a day  
Instagram - Posts from Instagram matching specific hashtags will be ingested 
Forums 
- Content from more than 9,000 online discussion sites where people hold 
conversations in the form of posted messages, centered around a single topic 
- ~125,000 posts/day 
Q&A 
- Content from platforms where users can ask questions and receive answers 
from the community 
- Main sites include Quora and Yahoo! Answers 
Reviews - User-generated reviews on companies or products - Main sites include Glassdoor and Amazon 
Reddit 
- Posts: posts from Reddit users 
- Comment: comments on Reddit posts 
- Subreddits: access to the top 16,000 sub-reddits and growing 
                                                 
121 Adapted from Zignal Labs Help Portal,” accessed November 6, 2018, 
https://zignallabs.freshdesk.com/support/solutions/articles/24000006641-sources. 
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The service provides a real time dashboard based on both the campaign and the 
specific profiles. This allows the user to see real time metrics and provides tools or desktop 
“widgets” to visualize the incoming data. Some of the more useful widgets include total 
mentions, average counts, net sentiment on keywords, top authors, top hashtags, visual 
depictions of the origins of collected data and even an emoji cloud.122  
 
Figure 14. Zignal Labs Dashboard Example 
The other primary function that was utilized for this project was the data export 
tool. A list of terms related to the Islamic State, Tunisian and Libyan government, foreign 
fighters were inputted into the application and geographically limited to North Africa. 
Zignal scanned, collected and stored the information on those keywords regularly and in 
November of 2018 a two-month data pull was enacted. This data was exported into an edge 
list that contained pertinent information on Twitter accounts that met the geographic and 
key word criteria. That edge list was then processed via the Gephi network analysis tool. 
                                                 




Gephi is an open-source software program used for network visualization and 
analysis. It is user friendly and provides intuitive visual renderings of complex networks. 
In addition to its visual capabilities, the program has basic metrics and analysis tools as 
well as a data exporter that allows users to go to the granular level of individual accounts 
if they merit a further look.  
C. HUBS AND AUTHORITIES 
“The hubs and authorities algorithm was initially designed for identifying which 
web pages functioned as hubs and which ones functioned as authorities where a good hub 
was defined as one that points to many good authorities, and a good authority is one that is 
pointed to by many good hubs.” These are the sources of information and the brokers of 
information.123 
D. BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
 “Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which each actor lies on the 
shortest path between all other actors in a network.” This is a measure to quantify the 
amount of influence an actor has over the flow of information within the network.124 
 
  
                                                 
123 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks. 
124 Everton. 
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